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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005196

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SUBJECT: DEPUTY INTERIOR MIN KHALID: REFORM NEEDED ON
GOVERNORS, MOI AND ANP

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann by reason 1.4(A) and (D)

11. (S) SUMMARY: A/DCM and Polmiloff met with Afghan Deputy Minister of the Interior (MoI) Khalid, Afghan National Police (ANP), General Salihi A. Baiani and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Senior Police Advisor Colonel Pitchlynn October 15. In a candid, confidential, and wide-ranging discussion Khalid (strictly protect) expressed the need to remove several provincial governors involved in heavy corruption and with close ties to the drug trade, as well as the need to remove the current Minister of the Interior Zarar. He argued that a combination of corruption, narcotics trafficking involvement and incompetence contributed to the deterioration of provincial security. He also addressed the need for further ANA reforms and more training for the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP).
END SUMMARY

CORRUPT GOVERNORS AND PROBLEMS AT THE MOI

12. (S) Khalid claimed a number of governors had strong ties to the drug trade. These corrupt officials are indirectly supporting the Taliban through their illicit activities and are losing the support of their populations. The GoA needs strong and competent leaders as provincial governors. However, he asserted that former Northern Alliance leaders are in these positions and they are more or less acting as warlords. Taliban support is growing in provinces where they are able to guarantee security for the population as well as the poppy crop, he said. Khalid suggested President Karzai sack Kandahar Governor Assadullah Khalid and choose a national figure, from outside the province, with age and stature. According to Khalid, Governor Assadullah does not have respect for the local conservative traditions and has angered many tribal elders. Khalid recommended an elder "statesman" for the Khandahar position, one who would understand the traditions and could work with tribal elders and provincial religious leaders. He also cited Helmand's National Directorate of Security (NDS) chief as another official contributing to instability due to his former affiliation with the Taliban and protection of known poppy growers. Although Khalid stated there were many corrupt

governors, he said that if he could pick only two for removal Assadullah and Balkh governor Mohammad Atta would top his list.

13. (S) Khalid (strictly protect) also called for the removal of his boss, Minister Zarar. According to Khalid, Zarar is not qualified for the job, but also is corrupt. "The MoI has always suffered from a lack of credible leadership at the top," he said and cited two previous ministers who used their positions to populate the ANP with Northern Alliance commanders. Khalid also said mismanagement within the MoI has led to a general inability to address high level corruption among the senior levels. It was stated that there are "10,000 ANP officers who are directly under the control of the former MoI officials" and that many of these officers owe their positions due to patronage networks led by two previous ministers, both whom are now parliamentarians. Khalid noted that former Minister Jalali was a good man, and was good working the social scene in Kabul, but had not been strong enough to make the kind of personnel changes necessary to root out corruption and factionalism that had permeated the ministry by the time of his arrival.

ANP REFORM MUST REMOVE CORRUPT GENERALS, OFFER BETTER TRAINING

14. (S) Kahlid stated that Afghanistan needs a good national police force as well as a professional intelligence service. He complained that the GoA focuses too much energy on creating a strong Afghan National Army (ANA). "The army's role is to protect the state from external threats," Khalid said, "The Taliban are an internal security threat that can

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be countered through a strong national police force." Commenting on the NDS, he added, "They are overly concerned with Pakistan, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries and have not provided intelligence on the drug traffickers infiltrating the country and operating freely in much of the south."

15. (S) Khalid called for the removal of all senior ANP Generals. When asked, Khalid claimed that even the process of selecting 31 senior generals and 86 senior MoI officers jointly with the international community had failed to select upright officers, even before President Karzai intervened with his late appointments. (Note: Many of the late appointments made by President Karzai have been found by an International Probation Board to possess a background of human rights violations, excessive corruption and poor leadership. After reviewing weekly mentor reports and significant background material provided by post and UNAMA, 6 of the 14 late appointments have been recommended for dismissal to the Minister of Interior and President Karzai and three have so far been fired. End Note)

16. (S) The Regional Training Centers are U.S. centers run by contractors, not Afghans, Khalid said. He recognized the RTC's teach basic police skills but he said they did not instill enough 'patriotism and sense of duty' in the curriculum. "The issue is not how to fight, Afghans have done this for 30 years, the issue is to teach them why they are fighting and instill a sense of pride and loyalty to the new Afghanistan." Khalid also noted cases of cultural insensitivity that led to new (and often illiterate) recruits undergoing education and training for the first time in their lives, leaving or being dismissed from training before they had been socialized into accepting the ANP system of discipline. Kahlid believed that a softer "Afghan" approach was sometimes needed. One example he gave occurred when a recruit had turned the visor on his cap sideways so it wouldn't bump into the floor when praying at the RTC mosque, and then was upbraided by his western mentor after he came out and had not switched it back to the standard front position for the visor. This incident quickly led to a larger

confrontation because a number of the recruits were his fellow tribesmen. Khalid also claimed that, although there were mosques at the RTCs, there were no Imams attached to the mosques.

¶7. (S) Addressing recruitment, Khalid also said that the ANP needs higher caliber recruits. He suggested the MoI recruit directly from communities with consultation and support of tribal elders and religious leaders who have support of the population. Khalid opined that dividing the regional commands up into eight zones, would be better for police work than the current five, which matches the current Army regional command structure. He also cited the need to reorganize the MoI intelligence division to focus on warlords and illegal armed groups. Comment: At one DIAG meeting, Khalid stated that the MOI had no operating orders specifying a duty to carry out DIAG work and no MOI office with that responsibility, even though everyone knew it was a national goal. End comment. Khalid also said the Kabul police force needs to be reformed so that it is a truly national force representative of all Afghans. Otherwise, some people from the provinces point at Kabul and complain that the national garrison is all made up of one ethnic group.

¶8. (S) Regarding intelligence sharing, Khalid criticized the NDS for not sharing information with the MoI. He said what information they shared often turned out to be incorrect. "NDS should deliver information about many activities: warlords, drug traffickers, and border controls," he said adding, "NDS intelligence is also politically motivated."

¶9. (S) Border security is recognized as a crucial task that must be accomplished and is imperative to Kabul's defense. The corruption within the border police and at checkpoints directly threatens Kabul's security. The ANP's inability to, stop the terrorists at the border has recently led to the

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development of a plan to defend Kabul from the increased threat of suicide bombers and the infiltration of large quantities of explosives into the capitol region.

SUPPORT FOR A/G SABIT

¶10. (S) Khalid offered strong praise for Chief Justice Azimi and for Attorney-General Sabit. He said that his relationship with Sabit is sufficiently close that he talks to him regularly. In fact he mentioned that he had called Sabit on his cell phone that day to discover that Sabit was in Mazar-I-Sharif. When Khalid asked him what he was doing there, Sabit replied "hunting." (Comment: Sabit's term for rooting out corrupt local officials. End Comment)

COMMENT

¶11. (S) COMMENT: CSTC-A and post are actively working on many of the issues Khalid raised. The ongoing ANP Rank and Reform Process to evaluate senior ANP officers for their competence and honesty is an important example of an initiative aimed at the heart of the problems that Khalid identified. Several generals who have not met the criteria have already been sacked. Additionally, CSTC-A and the German Police Project Office (GPPPO) are aware of the training deficiencies Khalid identified and are developing instruction plans to include an emphasis on Afghan culture and values as well as the importance of policing within the Afghan society. However, matching seasoned police trainers with cultural sensitivity will continue to be a challenge. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) Political officer David Izadifar voiced praise for Khalid during an October 17 conversation on an unrelated matter. Additionally, he added Khalid has a strong reputation throughout the GOA for

integrity. Others question whether he is strong enough for his job. And like most Afghan officials we suspect Khalid has his own agenda and hopes for USG support. All that said, there is much merit in his views. END COMMENT
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